Groups like the Islamic State of Khorasan could oppose the negotiations and try to attract disgruntled Taliban. The insurrection is not a homogeneous organization. These include other insurgent groups, drug trafficking organizations, tribes and militias, some of which may strongly oppose a peace agreement. Even successful peace agreements have been threatened by cheerleaders who refuse to participate and instead remain committed to violence to achieve their goals, such as the Real Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland and the National Liberation Army in Colombia. Both carried out attacks before, during and after the peace agreements. Another possibility is that the Taliban are the main reason for the failure of the talks, either because the Taliban leadership refuses to enter into negotiations or because it makes demands that are unacceptable to the United States and the Afghan government. The Taliban have already clashed with many issues such as the legitimacy of the current Afghan government and the exchange of prisoners. The Afghan government did not participate in the February 2020 agreement because the Taliban felt that the Ghani government was illegitimate and they refused to negotiate with their representatives. Taliban leaders also left talks with the Afghan government in April 2020, after failing to reach an agreement on the prisoner exchange. U.S. and Taliban officials who participated in the signing of a landmark agreement in Qatar in February avoided calling it a «peace agreement.» Although these leaders wield enormous power within the Taliban, they have little or no military experience and are therefore wary of commanders on the ground. These commanders are usually younger than the Quetta Shura, most often in the 20s and 30s. Many operate in remote and hostile areas of Afghanistan, with little connection or instruction from Taliban leaders in Quetta.
After all, the real success of the Taliban is the military success of these local commanders in Afghanistan. Thanks to the work of these regional commanders, the Taliban now control nearly 50 percent of the Afghan landscape. They are at the heart of the Taliban and many have different views on what a peace agreement with the United States should be. Neither side said exactly when the more substantive negotiations would begin or offered more details. US Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad, the architect of the peace process, tweeted, however, that the two sides had «established a tripartite agreement of rules and procedures for their negotiations on a political roadmap and a comprehensive ceasefire.» The Taliban`s intransigence has contributed to the rise in violence. The Taliban have stepped up attacks on Afghan forces under the February 2020 agreement, according to the US Special Comptroller for the Reconstruction of Afghanistan. UN data showed similar trends. Taliban attacks in April 2020 increased by 25 percent compared to April 2019, with violence spreading to twenty of the country`s thirty-four provinces.
On February 29, 2020, the United States and the Afghan Taliban signed a peace agreement in Doha, Qatar, aimed at ending the long war in Afghanistan. The agreement contains largely the same terms that were agreed upon in September 2019, but were sunk by President Trump. In essence, this agreement requires the withdrawal of THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES and the coalition from Afghanistan in exchange for the promise that the Taliban would not allow terrorist groups to operate on Afghan soil. However, the agreement is based on several assumptions that will make their success problematic. The agreement is on the premise that the Afghan government operates in Kabul and with whom it will be possible to negotiate. The recent Afghan presidential elections, instead of resolving those who lead, have indeed muddied the waters. The failure of the presidential election took place last September, but the vote counting process was so confusing and controversial that the winner was not announced until February 18, 2020, nearly five months after the elections. . .